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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
There appears to be no logical basis for distinguishing U.A.R.T. viola-
tions from Municipal Code violations insofar as the wording of the com-
plaint. The penalties and effects are similar in both cases. The municipality
is a mere creature of the state subject to restrictions placed upon it by the
legislature. The Municipal Code is subject to the same constitutional re-
strictions as is the U.A.R.T. Thus, there is extant, an area of law where
artificial distinctions have been imposed by judicial decision. The way is
open, then, for legislative equalization of treatment under the two bodies
of law. At the very least, supreme court clarification is called for.
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE McNABB RULE
INTRODUCTION
At early common law a confession, no matter how obtained, was admis-
sible in evidence against the person making it. In fact, a confession was
considered as the strongest evidence of guilt. In England, during the Star
Chamber proceedings, which were inquisitional in nature, many tortures
were administered to the accused to make him confess.' Modern courts,
however, have looked with a jaundiced eye on any confessions made in
such a manner. As a general rule, a confession will be admitted into evi-
dence only if it is freely and voluntarily made without any inducements
made to the accused in order to obtain the confession.2
Previous to the 1943 case of McNabb v. United States8 the courts gen-
erally held that voluntariness was the only test to be applied in determin-
ing admissibility of a confession and a delay in arraignment was only to
be considered as a factor in the voluntariness of the confession.4 In People
v. Vinci5 the Illinois Supreme Court had stated the general rule:
While an officer is frequently justified in subjecting a prisoner to a lengthy
and vigorous examination for the purpose of satisfying himself of the guilt of
the accused or for the purpose of getting information which would lead to
the discovery of crime, whether information thus elicited is a voluntary con-
fession must depend upon the facts of each case. 6
1 Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441, 267 S.W. 231 (1924).
2 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). This comment, however, does not con-
cern itself with confessions made under inducements or promises of immunity.
8 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
4 People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 45 (1873); Cahill v. People, 111 Colo. 29, 137 P.2d 673
(1943); Douberly v. State, 184 Ga. 573, 192 S.E. 223 (1937); People v. Vinci, 295 Ill.
419, 129 N.E. 193 (1920); People v. Crabb, 372 Ill. 347, 24 N.E.2d 46 (1939); Common-
wealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936); People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192,
192 N.E. 289 (1934); Cates v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 35, 37 S.W.2d 1031 (1930).
5 295 Ill 419, 129 N.E. 193 (1920).
6 Ibid., at 426, 195.
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THE MC NABB RULE AND SUBSEQUENT EFFECT
In McNabb, the defendants, ignorant young men, were subjected after
their arrest to incessant questioning by officers for a period of two days.
Friends were not allowed to visit them, nor was counsel afforded. While
in the custody of the officers and prior to arraignment before a United
States commissioner or judicial officer, as required by law,7 they made in-
criminating statements which were admitted into evidence at their trial.
The Court avoided all constitutional issues and exercised its supervisory
powers over rules of evidence in federal criminal proceedings. As a guide
to admissibility the Court adopted "civilized standards of procedure" in
place of the previously announced test of "general authority and sound
reason." Thus the Court excluded the confessions on the ground that
they had been obtained in violation of the legal rights of the defendants
and by willful disobedience of the law on the part of the arresting officer.
Justice Reed dissented on the grounds that the confessions were volun-
tary and were not inadmissible merely because there was a delay in de-
fendant's arraignment in contravention of the statute.
In subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
the McNabb rule has been approved and the courts have ruled that con-
fessions made during an unreasonable period of delay between arrest and
arraignment were inadmissible. 9 Without careful analysis it would seem
that delay in arraignment was only one of many circumstances considered
in McNabb as rendering the confession inadmissible. This idea received
some support in United States v. Mitchell1 0 where the Court stated that
the features of the McNabb rule were, "inexcusable detention for the
purpose of illegally extracting evidence from an accused, and the success-
7 Authority cited note 3, supra, at 342: "[It] shall be the duty of the marshall .... who
may arrest a person ... to take the defendant before the nearest United States commis-
sioner . . . Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, sec. 1, 28 Stat. 416 .... [The] Act of June 18, 1934,
c. 595, 48 Stat. 1008, authorizing Federal Bureau of Investigation Officers to make arrests,
requires that, 'the person arrested shall be immediately taken before a committing offi-
cer.' Compare also the Act of March 1, 1879, c. 125, 20 Stat. 327, 341 . . . when arrests
are made of persons in the act of operating an illicit distillery, the arrested persons shall
be taken forthwith before some judicial officer...." (Emphasis added.)
S Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933).
9 United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410
(1948) (thirty hour delay); United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661 (C.A. 7th, 1943) (sev-
eral days delay); United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416 (C.A.2d, 1943) (several days
delay); Runnels v. United States, 138 F.2d 346 (C.A. 9th, 1943) (seventeen day delay);
Akowskey v. United States, 81 App. D.C. 353, 158 F.2d 649 (1946) (seven hour delay);
Hayes v. District of Columbia, 34 A.2d 709 (Mun. Ct. App. Dist. Co1., 1943) (three day
delay); Bums v. District of Columbia, 34 A.2d 714 (Mun. Ct. App. Dist. Col., 1943)
(two day delay).
10 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
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ful extraction of such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning
for many hours under psychological pressure.""
However, in 1948, the Supreme Court denied the apparent holding of
the Mitchell case that aggravating circumstances were necessary to the
application of the McNabb doctrine. In Upshaw v. United States,12 the
Court clarified its reason for pointing out the aggravating circumstances
in the McNabb case and said: "This was done to show that the record left
no doubt that the McNabbs were not promptly taken before a judicial
officer as the law required. .... -13
In excluding Upshaw's confession and reversing the conviction, the
Court made this statement concerning the McNabb rule:
A confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure
promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or not
the confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological. 14
In Carignan v. United States,15 after defendant was arrested and duly
committed on the charge of assault with intent to commit rape, he con-
fessed to a murder. The Court declined to extend the McNabb doctrine
to statements to police or wardens while prisoners are legally detained on
other charges.'O
In Brown v. Allen 17 the McNabb case was cited as adopting for federal
courts a rule "that denies admission to confessions obtained before prompt
arraignment notwithstanding their voluntary character.""' This analysis
of the rule is particularly interesting when it is observed that the opinion
of the Court was written by Justice Reed who had dissented in McNabb.
The case of Mallory v. United States19 treated the McNabb rule as one
of delay-not of coercion and thus the Court has fully clarified the rule
and fully construed the statute.2 0 In Mallory the Court held that arraign-
ment was not made "without unnecessary delay" as required by rule 5 (a),
and that a confession given during the period of delay was inadmissible.
Mallory, 19 years old and of limited intelligence, was arrested on suspicion
of rape and was questioned by police for approximately a half hour. He
was submitted to lie detector tests, one of them lasting for an hour and
a half; he was not told of his right to counsel nor of any other of his basic
11 Ibid., at 67. 13Ibid., at 413. 15 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
12335 U.S. 410 (1948). 14 Ibid. 16 Ibid., at 45.
17344 U.S. 443 (1953).
18 Ibid., at 476 (emphasis supplied).
19 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
20 5 (a) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "An officer making an arrest
under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a
warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest
available commissioner...."
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constitutional rights and was not arraigned until he confessed, although
the arraignment could easily have been made. Mallory is very similar to
McNabb in that there were many other factors bearing on the voluntari-
ness of the confession besides the delay. The Court, however, in a unani-
mous opinion treated these factors only in consideration of whether the
arraignment was "without unnecessary delay."
The case of Trilling v. United States,21 a very recent decision in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, has been, along with
Mallory and McNabb, the subject of heated congressional discussion.22
Trilling had been arrested on probable cause at 5:30 A.M. for breaking
into a warehouse with intent to steal. At approximately 8:30 A.M., he con-
fessed to the crime for which he was arrested but was questioned about
two other robberies to which he confessed before his arraignment at about
3:00 P.M. the same day. The court of appeals affirmed the action of the
trial court in allowing the first confession into evidence, but reversed the
court's decision in allowing the other two confessions as a violation of the
rules in McNabb and Mallory.
The obvious distinction between Carignan and Trilling is that in the
former the accused was legally detained when he confessed to the murder,
and in the latter the accused was held an unreasonable time before arraign-
ment when he confessed to the second and third robberies.
Thus, after fourteen years of analysis and consideration, the McNabb
rule is fairly well defined.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF STATE COURT DECISIONS
The state courts have refused to apply the strict rule established by the
McNabb case. The state courts have continued to hold admissible confes-
sions made by an accused whose arraignment was made in violation of a
statute, since the McNabb rule is a rule of Federal procedure and, there-
fore, not binding on the state courts.23
Thus, in Gallegos v. Nebraska24 a Mexican farmhand, who could neither
speak nor write English, while being held by the police in Texas at the
request of the United States Immigration Service, without charge, con-
fessed a Nebraska murder. A few days after arrival in Nebraska, he again
confessed. Fifteen days after his confession, he was arraigned before a
magistrate. The Court held the confession admissible on the grounds that
the McNabb rule does not apply to state courts, even though they have a
21260 F.2d 677 (App. D.C., 1958).
22 104 Cong. Rec. 17036, Aug. 19, 1958.
23 State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 178 S.W. 2d 77 (1944) (two day delay); State v.
Smith, 158 Kan. 645, 149 P.2d 600 (1944) (three day delay); State v. Goyet, 119 Vt. 167,
132 A.2d 623 (1957).
24 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
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statute similar to Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and in the absence of coercion due process is not violated.
Also, in Stein v. New York 25 the state, at a trial for murder, used con-
fessions made only after prolonged police relay interrogations. Twelve
hours of questioning were stretched over a thirty-two hour period. The
Court held these confessions to be properly admitted.
A confession obtained after an unreasonable delay in taking the accused
before a magistrate is not inadmissible as a violation of due process.20 But
the Supreme Court may exclude a confession made during a delay if other
circumstances show a violation of due process.2 7
Thus, in Watts v. Indiana28 where Watts was without sleep and decent
food while being kept in "the hole" for two days. He was then questioned
in relays during five night sessions. On three occasions he was driven
around town with the purpose of eliciting identifications, and was not
brought before a magistrate as required by state law. He was also deprived
of his right to counsel during this whole period. The Supreme Court
ruled his subsequent confession inadmissible as a violation of due process.
In Haley v. Ohio29 a conviction of murder was reversed when the con-
viction was obtained upon evidence which included a confession made
by the defendant, a 15 year old Negro, after five hours of questioning by
the police following his arrest at night. He was deprived of his right to
counsel and was held incommunicado for over three days before being
taken before a magistrate and formally charged with a crime.
RULE IN STATE COURTS SINCE MC NABB
The state courts have avoided the rule in McNabb by saying that it is
merely a rule of federal procedure, not a constitutional issue and, there-
fore, not binding on them. In stating this position, the courts are over-
looking a very basic fact. The vast majority of states have rules very simi-
lar, if not exact copies of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules.8 0
25 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
26 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953);
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
27 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948);
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
28 338 U.S. 49 (1949). 2 9 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
30 California Penal Statute (1949) § 825: "The defendant must in all cases be taken
before a magistrate without unnecessary delay... ." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 38, § 660:
"[Without] a warrant . . . the person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be
taken before the nearest magistrate. . . ." § 665: "[Warrant]-[The] officer is directed
forthwith to take the person and bring him before . . . (a) judge or justice [who
issued the warrant]." (Emphasis supplied.)
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There have been many state court decisions since McNabb that make
no mention of the rule. 31 In People v. Miller32 the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that a confession was not rendered inadmissible because it was
made while the accused was illegally arrested or detained without process
if the confession was otherwise voluntary.
The fact that a defendant was not granted a preliminary hearing as
required by statute, was held by the Mississippi Supreme Court not to
affect the admissibility of a confession made during detention before trial.33
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Pierce34 declared that a
confession was admissible although there was a delay in bringing the
accused before a magistrate, as required by statute. The court reasoned
that the delay was only to be taken into consideration when considering
the voluntariness of the confession.
There are countless cases in other jurisdictions which have followed this
reasoning. Although the vast majority of jurisdictions have statutes similar
to Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, from a study of
the cases reported there seems to be no enforcement nor reason for the
statutes. The only test is voluntariness and this is determined from all the
facts and circumstances. It might be called the complete picture doctrine.
The states seem to forget that psychological pressure is very easily applied
during a delay between arrest and arraignment.
RECENT ATTEMPTS AT LEGISLATION
The McNabb rule has been the subject of much congressional debate
and criticism. 35 However, the debate that ensued after that decision was
very tame compared to the discussion that has followed Mallory and
Trilling.3 6
Congressional action has taken the form of various bills introduced on
the floor. All of the bills introduced have been defeated, but it would not
be amiss to consider some of them here.37
31 Hightower v. State, 62 Ariz. 351, 158 P.2d 156 (1945); People v. Bashor, 48 Cal.2d
763, 312 P.2d 255 (1957); People v. Miller, 13 l1.2d 84, 148 N.E.2d 455 (1958); Napue v.
People, 13 111.2d 566, 150 N.E.2d 613 (1958); State v. Triplett, 248 Iowa 339, 79 N.W.2d
391 (1956); State v. Harriot, 248 Iowa 225, 79 N.W.2d 332 (1956); People v. Trinchillo,
2 App.Div.2d 146, 153 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1956); Mitchell v. State, 312 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.
Cr., 1958).
32 13 11I.2d 84, 148 N.E.2d 455 (1958).
33 Winston v. State, 209 Miss. 799, 48 So.2d 513 (1950).
34 4N.J. 252, 72 A.2d 305 (1950).
35 E.g., 93 Cong. Rec. 1392; H.R. 29, 80th Cong. 1st Session (1948).
36 E.g., 104 Cong. Rec. 17036-17059, 17075-17084, 17085-17100, 17112-17125, Aug. 19,
1958.
37 For a more complete discussion of congressional action, see Hogan and Snee, The
McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. L.J. 1, 33-46 (1958).
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Senator Butler proposed a definite time limit approach to the problem38
by adding a new section to Rule 2 of the Federal Rules, which in essence
would provide a twelve hour time limit in presenting an accused before a
magistrate.
Senator Morse introduced an idea similar to the Judges' rules in Eng-
land.30 In essence, the bill provided that before a person could be interro-
gated: (1) he must be informed of the nature of the offense; (2) he
must be informed of his rights relating to self-incrimination; (3) he must
be informed of his right to counsel; and (4) he must be told that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The bill further pro-
vided that the burden was on the prosecution to prove that the provisions
of the bill had been complied with and that in the absence of such proof
any confession obtained would be inadmissible.40 It is submitted that the
Morse bill would not have altered the McNabb rule in the least, but
would have provided additional safeguards for the accused. The bill itself
has no reference to the length of time between arrest and arraignment.
Other proposals introduced have been direct attempts to abolish the
McNabb rule. The Willis-Keating bill41 provided:
Evidence including statements and confessions, otherwise admissible, shall
not be inadmissible solely because of delay in taking an arrested person before
a commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with
offenses against the laws of the United States.
This bill also required that the accused be told that (1) he is not re-
quired to make a statement and (2) that any statement made by him may
be used against him. The bill was passed in the House but when it reached
the Senate it was changed to read, "solely because of reasonable delay."
The addition of this one word certainly changed the effect of the bill. In
fact, the addition of the one word, "reasonable" made the bill a collection
of words having no effect on the McNabb rule. In congressional debate
the point was well taken that the difference between "without unneces-
sary delay" and "reasonable delay" was purely one of semantics and judges
would still construe the phrase in the same manner. 42 An unnecessary de-
lay is still illegal under Rule 5(a), and therefore such a delay could cer-
tainly not be deemed a reasonable one.
The amendment was passed by a 41-39 margin 43 and the bill as amended
passed 65-1244 but was referred to conference. The conference added the
38 S. 3355, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
30 E.g., R. v. Straffen, [1952] 2 Q.B. 911, [1952] 2 All E. R. 657.
40 S. 3325, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
41 H. R. 11477, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
42 104 Cong. Rec. 17046-47 (Aug. 19, 1958).
43 Ibid., at 17116. 44 Ibid., at 17125.
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words: "Provided, that such a delay is to be considered as an element in
determining the voluntary or involuntary nature of such statements or
confessions. ' 45 This amendment was defeated by a point of order that the
amendment was matter never considered on the floor.46 Thus the bill died
and the McNabb rule stands supreme.47
CONCLUSION
The McNabb rule, as harsh as it may seem, without delving into its real
purpose, stands today as a basic safeguard of the rights of the accused in
facing a federal court. Is the rule, as some claim it is,4 8 a punishment for
the police rather than a protection for the accused? That the rule is a
punishment for the police seems to be a very falacious argument when it
is considered that detention can be used as a very definite factor in co-
ercion. The argument may be raised: "What harm can there be in holding
a man a few hours or days, in the absence of physical coercion?" True,
there may be no physical coercion, but a factor to be considered is psy-
chological coercion. It is true that the Supreme Court has stated that it
will exclude a confession made after an unnecessary delay, even though
there is no evidence of coercion, physical or psychological; 49 but could
the reason for this statement be that psychological coercion is a very
difficult fact to prove?
Certainly, there are many quesions raised as to the real reason for the
McNabb rule but there can be no questions raised as to its propriety.
45 House-Senate Conference amendment to H. R. 11477, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Aug.
23, 1958.
46 104 Cong. Rec. 18093-18101, Aug. 25, 1958.
47 Hogan and Snee, op. cit. supra, note 37 at 46.
48 Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 IM. L. Rev.
442 (1948).
49 Authority cited note 14, supra.
